At the Open, the threat level appears to be permanently set on orange and security is always high. Security is so high that, when I presented my bag for inspection, the gal behind the table said, "Is that a Kindle? You can't bring that in."
What?
As Ed said, if you can take a Kindle on an airplane, which you can, you should be able to take a Kindle to the Open.
But no. I was supposed to hike two blocks -- uphill and in the sun -- back the way I came in 'til I got to a tent where I could pay another employee five bucks to check my Kindle.
Or, alternatively, I could walk a couple hundred yards back to the ladies' room, secrete my Kindle on my person, present my bag for inspection a second time, and enter the grounds without further ado. Which is what I did.
I told Ed, "Any security system that relies on terrorists to pay some guy five bucks to check his explosive device isn't a security system."
More anon.
Security expert Bruce Schneier (rhymes with "liar" and "tire" in my dialect) calls this "Security Theater". Its purpose is to make it seem as though someone is doing something to make the scene more secure, but in reality it has little impact on actual safety. Bruce frequently riffs on airport security and the TSA on his blog, along with computer security (he started out in cryptography).
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