Another classic example of
hyperspecificity:
C. did not recognize this expression as a case of the distributive property:
2x(x+1) + 3(x+1)
Can't say I blame him.
update from Barry:This isn't real obvious when you first come across it. So do this. Let's let x + 1 = T.
Now substitute T in the expression and you get:
2x(T) + 3(T)
Can you factor out the T?
Yes. You get T(2x + 3)
Now substitute the x + 1 back in. You get:
(x+1)(2x+3)
I think it was Ron Aharoni who referred to seeing expressions such as (x+1) as single entities as "chunking". To help students do such "chunking" it helps to do what I did above so they can see that x + 1 represents a number, and as such it can be factored.
I'm amazed by how difficult it is to see that "expression X" is the same as "expression Y." This is an ongoing source of pain in my mental life these days (not to put too fine a point on it), because I came to feel, shortly after
Animals in Translation was completed, that Temple's & my thesis concerning
hyperspecificity in animals and autistic people is wrong in some important way -- either wrong or perhaps right for the wrong reasons.
We argued that autistic people, children, and animals are
hyperspecific compared to typical adults.
Autistic people, children, and animals are splitters; nonautistic adults are lumpers; etc. (I know I've said all this before, but feel I must repeat in case newcomers stop by.)
The classic hyperspecificity story re: autistic children is the little boy who was painstakingly taught to spread butter on bread and then had no clue how to spread peanut butter on bread.
Until I began to reteach myself math, this kind of thing seemed to me incontrovertible evidence of the otherness of the autistic brain. But now that I'm factoring trinomials I've discovered I have something in common with that little boy. That's probably why God or the universe decided I should take up math. I needed an object lesson.
Still, the observations Temple has spent a lifetime making of animals' (and autistic people's)
hyperspecificity aren't wrong. Normal adult humans aren't
hyperspecific in the same way animals and autistic people are
hyperspecific.
Sometimes I wonder whether the issue is simply that non-autistic adults pass through
the hyperspecific stage of knowledge more quickly or more frequently than autistic people do. When a "typical" adult (
typical being the preferred term these days) encounters brand-new material he, too, is
hyperspecific, as I am with math. Everyone starts out a splitter.
But I don't think that's quite it, either.
I'm getting the feeling that animals may not be
hyperspecific across the board, but perhaps only in certain realms. Maybe animals are more
hyperspecific than adult humans when it comes to sensory data? e.g.: To a horse a saddle feels completely different at a walk, a trot, and a canter -- so different that he will buck his rider off when he moves from a trot to a canter if he hasn't been carefully trained to tolerate the saddle at all 3 gates
individually.
Better story: Temple's black hat horse.
This was a horse who was terrified of people wearing black hats. He wasn't terrified of people wearing white hats or red hats. Just black hats.
I'm thinking, this morning, that humans may be relatively oblivious to "sensory data," that we're lost in words -- so perhaps words are the place where you'll see us being
hyperspecific ? (There's evidence that language masks sensory data, but I don't know it/remember it well enough to summarize.)
Temple complains about this all the time. She'll give a talk and her audience will take away a too-specific meaning from her words; then they'll go out and apply her advice all wrong & bollocks things up. "People get hung up on the specific words," she'll say. (I'll write down the next example of this that crops up - can't think of one offhand.) These conversations have gotten to be quite funny because, after years of reading countless articles on autistic people being literal-minded and "concrete," I am now spending my time listening to an autistic person complain that normal people are literal-minded.
Well, she's right. Looking at an expression like
2x(x+1) + 3(x+1), I'm like the horse with the saddle and so is my 13-year old son.
"x+1" next to 2x is completely different from "x+1" next to 3.
Different enough to make us start pitching our riders into the haystack.
percent troubles
Robert Slavin on transfer of knowledge
rightwingprof on what students don't know
Inflexible Knowledge: The First Step to Expertise